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Veiled Threats: Recurrent Cultural Anxieties in
Australia
ANNE ALY AND DAVIDWALKER
Abstract
At the end of the nineteenth century, white Australians found themselves in a tur-
bulent and rapidly changing world. As British settlers in a vast, often-perplexing
and under-populated continent, they were increasingly aware that they lived in a
crowded and predominantly Asian neighbourhood. Their supposedly empty spaces
seemed to invite the unwanted attention of hostile outsiders, fertile soil for speculation
about vulnerable borders, invasion and violation. It was commonplace of the period
for white females to be considered at once particularly vulnerable and also innocent
symbols of the new nation. They needed to be protected against Asian males alleg-
edly bent on conquest and violation. It does not follow that these “invasion narra-
tives”, however persistent, meant that the entire population was disabled by fear
and dread, but there is convincing evidence of a deeply embedded cultural anxiety
about the destructive possibilities and hostile intentions of Asian outsiders. In this
article, the authors examine recent representations of Muslims as hostile outsiders
in Australia, focusing in particular on the veil as a marker of female oppression
under Islam and a sign of the threat attributed to the Islamic community in Australia.
While it would be misleading to propose a simple line of progression from late nine-
teenth century apprehensions to those a century or more later, there are nonetheless
intriguing parallels and recurrent expressions of survivalist anxiety across the
period examined in this article.
Introduction
In 1995, The Australian Magazine featured an article titled “Behind the Holy Veil” by an
Australian journalist and author Geraldine Brooks.1 The article typifies the strain of
media coverage on Muslims and Islam in the decade preceding the 11 September
2001 attacks on the United States. Brooks attributes the return of the Islamic dress
code for women, the hijab or veil, to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Iran. A
similar article entitled “The Iron Veil” by Jan Goodwin appeared in a popular
women’s magazine:
Imagine you are totally segregated from mainstream society, you can’t choose
whom you’ll marry, how to dress or where to live. Educational opportunities
are limited and few jobs-or any other activities are open to you.2
The historically inherited stereotype of the Muslim woman as oppressed, shrouded in
black and walking 10 steps behind her husband, “like death out for a walk”,3 has
become a metaphor for the threat of Islamic fundamentalism within and beyond Austra-
lia’s borders. The Muslim woman is routinely represented as subordinate and passive, an
enigma shrouded in the black veil of religious oppression. In contrast to their Western
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counterparts, Muslim women are portrayed as inferior or backward. To many Western
women, the veil stands as the single, most powerful symbol of the gender based oppres-
sion that women in non-Western countries suffer.
Comparisons between the role and status of women in Australia and those from the
threatening societies are not new. The status of women is a prominent theme in the “inva-
sion narratives” of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It was assumed that
if Australia was overtaken by Asia, Australian women would experience a dramatic
decline in status and suffer cruel oppression.4 Contrasts between European and Asian
women suggested that European women fared much better. It followed that the “Asiani-
sation” of Australia would have dire consequences for the role and status of Australian
women.
The focus on the role of women in Islam and the representation of Muslim women as
oppressed and forced to wear a veil drew much the same response. Indeed, the veil has
come to represent Islam itself and the “veiled threat” has become code for the wider
threat of an Islamic presence in Australia drawing explicitly on fears that Australian cul-
tural values might collapse.
A History of Fear
Australia’s history is marked by expressions of anxiety about invasion and the destruction
of Australian culture. This cultural anxiety is grounded in the tension between Australia’s
history as a European settler society and its geo-political position on the south-eastern
fringe of Asia. Small in population and remote from Europe, the new nation sought
security through its association with distant but culturally similar allies, first Britain
and then the United States.5 From the 1880s, “peril” has been a recurrent theme in
Australia’s history. Intermittently this “peril” was “yellow”, “brown”, or, as in the
Vietnam war, “skin-yellow” but politically “red”.6
In the 1850s a series of events, including the opening of Japan and the Sepoy Rebellion
in India, brought Asian nations and aspirations onto the world stage. This, combined
with the arrival in Australia of large numbers of Chinese workers during the gold rush
period, prompted an awareness of the migratory nature of Asia and a keener realisation
of Australia’s proximity to its Pacific neighbours. From the late nineteenth century, the
“invasion narrative” captured many of the persistent anxieties about Asian otherness.7
Invasion writing was a genre popularised in Britain where the enemy was invariably
European. In Australian writing that external enemy was Asian, but internal social
trends also aroused concern. There were regular critiques of urbanisation along with
the trend towards smaller families leading to a worrying decline in the birth rate.8
Titles published from the 1880s include White or Yellow, The Yellow Wave: A Romance
of the Asiatic Invasion of Australia, The Yellow Danger and The Yellow Peril in Action.9
Representations of Asia as a threat to Australia persisted well into the twentieth
century. By the early 1900s, Australia had established its vision of an exclusively
Anglo-Celtic future expressed in the passing of the Immigration Restriction Act 1901,
better known as the White Australia Policy. Concern that Australia’s sparsely populated
continents might not withstand immigrating hordes from overpopulated Asian neigh-
bours gave way to fears about maintaining racial purity and cultural homogeneity in
Australia.10 According to Jones, racial purity was considered central to Australianness
at the time of Federation. Fears about miscegenation underpinned calls to maintain
“Australia for the White Man”.11 The White Australia Policy aimed at constructing
Australia as a homogenous white settler nation. The white races were commonly
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considered superior to what then-Prime Minister Barton referred to as the “coloured
races”, whom he claimed were “intrinsically inferior to the whites”.12 Ang contends
that in Australia, anxiety and suspicions of the “other” are rooted in an idea of a national
culture that was formed by the ideological assumptions of the White Australia Policy.
These anxieties, suggests Ang, are expressed not so much as a desire to return to White
Australia traditions, but rather as a desire to maintain the boundaries that define Australia
as a separate nation-state, or “fortress Australia”.13 Modifications to the Immigration
Restriction Act in the 1950s allowed for small numbers of non-European immigrants
under the distinguished and highly qualified immigration category, but it was not until
1973, after Britain joined the Common Market and rescinded favoured migration
relationships with Australia, that the newly elected Labour government, led by Gough
Whitlam, finally discarded racial criteria for migration to Australia.
Some one hundred years after the emergence of the “invasion narrative”, the concept
of an Asian invasion resurfaced. In 1996 Pauline Hanson emerged as the outspoken leader
of One Nation, a political party that saw Asian immigration as a threat to Australia’s
cultural traditions. In her maiden speech, Hanson maintained that Australia was “in
danger of being swamped by Asians”14 invoking familiar concepts of the “Asian invasion”
and cultural anxieties about the loss of a distinct national identity. Hanson echoed the
words of Arthur Calwell, Australia’s first and often controversial Minister for Immigration
who declared that Australia could never survive as a multi-racial society.15 Hanson was
also quoted in the Bulletin in 1996: “My fear is that if we keep going the way that we’re
going. . .the yellow race will rule the world, because they have different culture. A different
way of life”.16
The threat of an increasing Chinese presence in Australia had long been associated
with attempts to define and defend the role of the male in increasingly urban societies
where women were pressing for a larger stake in public affairs. Australia was almost a
case study of modernity, a wealthy society in which women’s education and the female
franchise were at the forefront of progressive politics. In positing a threat from Asia, inva-
sion writers maintained that white women would be the first to suffer enslavement and
violation. In the “invasion narrative”, securing the nation was the highest priority, not
progressive reform. In this schema, women needed men prepared to protect them
more than they needed the vote or new rights and freedoms. As one exponent of the
“invasion narrative” expressed it, the bushman of the rough interior was “the backbone
of resistance that the White Man will make to any Flow of Asia along the Pacific
littoral”.17 If the “new woman” was to survive, the bushman would prove to be her
saviour. The status of Australian women was regularly held up as a progressive accom-
plishment rather than a work in progress. It presented a stark contrast to an orient typi-
cally characterised by tales of harems and female slavery.18
In 1888, William Lane, a labour movement activist, wrote and serialised Australia’s
first invasion novel, White or Yellow: A Story of the Race War of AD 1908. In Lane’s
story, the leader of the Chinese in Queensland, Sir Wong Hung Foo, rapes and
murders Cissie Saxby, invoking an anti-Chinese uprising. Just over a century later,
Lane’s personification of the threat to Australian women resurfaced when a group of
young Australian men identified as being of Lebanese origin raped two Anglo-Australian
teenage girls. The popular media called the rapes an “act of war” against Anglo-Australia.
Comments such as those byAge editor Pamela Bone are a typical reflection of the way the
popular media interpreted the events: “Racially motivated rape, the intention of which
is to defile the women of the enemy, is as old as warfare, but it is devastating to think
that this could be happening in Australia today”.19 The rhetoric of war in reports of
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the so-called “Lebanese gang rapes” parallels the historical framing of the Asian male as
“an invasive figure bent on the violation of white women”.20 Media engagement with the
Lebanese rape case frequently contextualised it as an act of aggression whereby the
rapists targeted vulnerable females in an attempt to disempower and humiliate masculine
Australia. Indeed, it was as if the rapists had raped Australia herself. Their actions were
seen to be representative of the barbaric and misogynist Muslim culture, while young
Australian girls represented Australia’s vulnerability to the insidious threat of Muslim
culture. The Lebanese rape case reinforced the historically inherited stereotype of the
ugly Muslim male, an image which has persisted for at least a decade and which typically
portrayed Muslims as violent and sexist.21
Lane’s juxtaposition of the races in White or Yellow exemplified a common view that war
between the races was inevitable wherever racial mixing occurred. Racial homogeneity
was the only safe course. Subsequent titles such as Dawe’s Yellow and White published
in 1896 and Chidell’s Australia—White or Yellow? published 30 years later, continued
to draw on the notion of a global struggle for racial dominance.22 These were presented
as studies of what Samuel Huntington recently popularised as the “clash of civilisations”.
According to Huntington, the main source of international conflict after the Cold War
would be cultural, not political. The resurgence of religion throughout the world, he
claimed, underlines the philosophical assumptions, values, ideologies and customs that
separate different civilisations.23 Huntington’s theory has been largely dismissed by pol-
itical analysts. Chomsky, for example, saw the clash of civilisations as having popular
appeal, but little rational, scholarly basis24 and Corey Robin asserts that when viewed
as a “clash of civilisations”, terrorism is transported from politics into the realm of cul-
tural conflict.25 Despite this, the notion of world conflict being fought along the fault
lines of culture and religion has gained some currency since the terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Centre in September 2001 and the advent of the so called “war on
terror”. The September 11 attacks were portrayed by the popular Western media and
in the political arena as symptomatic of Islamic fundamentalism’s deep-seated anxiety
about modernity. The perpetrators of September 11 targeted the United States for its
values of liberty, democracy and freedom- values particularised in the political rhetoric
and media discourse as exclusively and characteristically Western. The “war on terror”
juxtaposes the free, liberal and civilised West with the backward, oppressive and unciv-
ilised Islam in much the same way as the “invasion narratives” particularised Asia as
the “yellow peril”.26
As early as 1912, Australians were being cautioned about the threat of an Islamic pre-
sence. In an address to a Melbourne audience entitled “The Moslem Menace”, the
Reverend George Brown, a prominent missionary, urged listeners to heed his warnings
about Australia falling under Islamic control. For the “Moslem Menace” to which he
referred to be fully understood, Brown maintained that Melbourne should experience
Islamic domination for twenty four hours in order to “realise the danger of wife or
sisters going in the streets unattended or unguarded”. Brown’s address inferred that
an Islamic presence in Australia was incompatible with the values of a dynamic and pro-
gressive Western civilisation.27 The target of his attack was unusual for the time. With
Asian invasion as the dominant threat, the “Moslem menace” was hard to present as a
convincing risk to Australia.
Madge Peterson’s The Lure of the Little Drum, first published in August 1913, echoed
the concerns voiced by Reverend Brown. The novel won the coveted title of Best Novel
for 1913 in a competition run by the British publishing house, Andrew Melrose Ltd.
Joseph Conrad was among the judges. By the end of the year, The Lure of the Little
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Drum had reached its fourth impression. The story is set against the splendid backdrop of
the Raj. Esther, a woman of unimpeachable loveliness from a background that was not all
it should have been, marries Gerald, a determinedly cheerful, tiger-hunting fellow.
Lurking in the background is Ishaq Khan, a prince (certainly) but also a Muslim agitator.
Esther tires of Gerald, falls into Khan’s encircling arms, and is soon installed in his
harem. His purpose is not amorous, but political vengeance. The Old India Hand of
the novel knows that Khan is motivated by “the passion of his hate”. Esther’s humiliating
enslavement satisfies his “lust of cruelty”. Worse still, Khan seeks “the joy of degrading
what we white men hold so dear, our women”.28 White women were represented as a
target in the war between the races, a terrible truth known only to the keenest students
of the oriental mind. It was exactly the point that the Reverend Brown had tried to
impress upon his Melbourne audience.
Muslims in the Australian Media
The Australian media’s interest in the Middle East was awakened by a series of global
events in the 1950s and 60s, among them the Suez Canal Crisis in 1957 and the Six
Day War in 1967.29 Typically, during this period, the Arab world was represented as a
fabled, exotic land in the tenor of Orientalism.30 It was not until the 1970s and 80s
that Australia’s detached interest in the Middle East developed into a concern over the
emergence of Arab terrorism. The terrorist attack at the 1972 Munich Olympics cap-
tured the attention of the global media and saw the beginnings of a pre-occupation
with the phenomenon of Islamic resurgence in the Australian popular media. By the
late 1970s the image of the Arab terrorist emerged as the dominant representation of
the Middle East in Australia.31 The Iranian revolution in 1979 quickly shifted the
focus to Islamic fundamentalism. Representations of Khomeini as a fanatical despot
became synonymous with Islamic fundamentalism as the international press focussed
on the orchestration of a terrorist campaign against the United States as the “Great
Satan”. Progressively throughout the 1980s the images inspired by Iran became inter-
changeable with Islam. The media repeatedly invoked images of fanatical Muslims
poised not only to cleanse their own societies but ultimately to Islamise the world,
instil religious law and annihilate Western liberal democracy. Reports of Islamic insur-
gency in both the Middle East and Asia inspired what Brasted terms the “domino
effect”, whereby it was assumed that Muslim countries would eventually yield to funda-
mentalist insurgents. The Islamic threat to Australia was a recurring theme in the popular
media but did not emerge as a serious threat until the 1990s.32
In the decade preceding the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the
threat of Islam to Australia gained momentum. Australia’s involvement in the 1991 Gulf
War, largely in a supportive capacity, ignited a debate on the presence of Muslims in
Australia in the popular media. Calls for Australian Muslims to be repatriated to their
countries of origin came through on talk back radio. John Laws, a prominent radio
announcer on Sydney’s Radio 2UE declared that Muslims opposed to the war should
“Go home. . .. It’s all simple. . .. If you wish to condemn Australia’s involvement in the
Middle East on personal grounds, then go home”.33 Between late 1990 and early
1991 nationalist sentiments were increasingly expressed in newspaper articles and
letters to the editor.34
The Islamic threat to Australia soon found expression in the representation of Muslim
women. While images of Muslim violence persisted, the Australian media began to
replace it with the image of the Islamic veil or hijab as the sole, most compelling,
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image of Islam. The dominant theme in popular print media articles focussed largely on
the role of women in Islam, the Islamic approach to human rights, Sharia punishments
and the connection between Islam and practices such as female genital mutilation and
honour killings. Increasingly, the image of Islam was that it was incompatible with the
ideals of Western liberal democracy and the “veiled threat” became the standard refer-
ence in many news items about Muslims.35
Muslim Women in Western Feminist Discourses
The Western feminist discourse largely portrays Muslim women as unable to speak for
themselves because of the repressive regimes under which they live.36 Thus the
Western woman is bound to speak on behalf of her Muslim sister. The notion of the
muted Muslim woman extends to Muslim women in Australia whose true voices are per-
ceived to be subdued by the oppressive, masculinised culture of Islam. This has effec-
tively reduced Muslim female identity to an article of clothing. The imagery is
powerful: the veil is the shroud through which the muffled voices of Muslim women
struggle to be heard. The emancipated Western woman seeks to symbolically, but also
literally, “unveil” Muslim women as if somehow the act of “unveiling” will free them
from their oppressive shackles. The diversity of the veil (headscarf or hijab, chador,
burqa) as well as the diversity of Muslim women is ignored. Muslim women are hom-
ogenised37 and objectified, losing their individual identities in the process. As Waleed
Aly has observed, “The Muslim woman, in her varying degrees of cover has become
merely a symbol; a battleground for a much broader polemic. She is not a person with
interests, aspirations, struggles and feelings”.38 Ironically, by focusing attention on
superficial symbols such as the veil, Western feminist discourse serves to distract atten-
tion from the feminist objective of achieving fundamental social rights for women.39
The last decade has seen a proliferation of books and articles in the popular media
about Muslim women. Almost all draw on the semiotics of the veil and include titles
such as My Forbidden Face, Without Mercy: Woman’s Struggle Against Modern Slavery,
Voices Behind the Veil and Nine Parts of Desire: The Hidden World of Islamic Women.40
Articles in the print media in particular draw explicitly on the imagery of the veil with
headlines such as “Nile warns of veiled threat”, “Veiled threat”, “Life behind veil of
Islam”, “The hijab jihad”, “Veiled threat an insult to all”, “Unveiling feminism in the
Koran”, “Hiding behind a veil of outrage”, and “Shrouded in strife”. Without exception,
all feature an all-too-familiar graphic of a Muslim woman, eyes peering imploringly from
behind a black veil. The veiled Muslim woman is a central figure in Orientalist discourse,
conjuring up a range of responses from oppression and misogyny to cultural threat and
terrorism.
In Nine Parts of Desire, Geraldine Brooks recounts her experiences in Saudi Arabia
where, as a female, it was easier for her “to get behind the veil than a male journalist”.41
The title of the book, it is claimed, is based on a quote from the Shiite religious leader Ali
who is reported to have said that God created sexual desire in 10 parts of which women
were endowed with nine and men with one. The title itself immediately associated
Muslim women with Western stereotypes of exotic orientalism. In contrast to progressive
Western societies, women in Islam are seen to be much more sexual than men and hence
need to be controlled through practices such as female genital mutilation and veiling.
The following comments are among the typical reactions to Brooks’ book by Western
women: it “gives you some idea of the fear of women inherent in this culture” and
“the reason behind the veiling and all of the radical and horrible restrictions. . . on
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Muslim women is. . .women are evil, men must take whatever measures are necessary to
protect themselves from US”.42 It comes as no surprise that Brooks, in at least one inter-
view, is referred to as “an expert on the role of women in Islam”.43 Yet in this same inter-
view she makes a colossal error in attributing the spread of female genital mutilation to
the introduction of Islam in Egypt and its subsequent spread to South East Asia. It is
widely known among Muslim women who have been campaigning against this practice44
that it predates both Islam and Christianity and that its affiliation with Islam is most often
attributed to a much contested Hadith of questionable authenticity known as Hadith Um
Attiyat. The fact that Brooks is heralded among Western women as an expert on Muslim
women demonstrates the hegemony of the Western feminist discourse. The voices of
Muslim women are muted, not by the veil, but all too often by Western feminists them-
selves. In closing her book, Brooks appeals to feminists and human rights advocates to do
what they can to save Muslim women. In response to Brooks’ appeal, one Muslim
woman wrote: “Ms. Brooks need not bother to strive for Muslim women’s rights to
bare their bodies if they chose to spiritually rejoice in covering them”.45
Western feminists rarely acknowledge that for some Muslim women donning the veil is
a matter of choice that is closely tied to their Islamic identity. In an article published in
the Canberra Times in March 2006, the proliferation of veiled women in Cairo is
somehow linked to the number of violent crimes against women and even to a ban on
abortion in the US state of South Dakota.46 Pamela Bone produced a series of articles
on Muslim women for the Age which also warrant examination. Two articles published
over a decade apart are titled “Life Behind the Veil of Islam” and “For Women, the Hijab
and the Burqa Reflect Their Subjugation”. The first title treats Islam and the veil as if the
two were synonymous. The latter equates the veil with oppression. Bone’s obsession with
the veil as a symbol of the role of women in Islam is apparent when she writes: “Islam
puts great emphasis on submission and obedience”.47 Bone neglects to mention that sub-
mission in Islam is to God and that both men and women must submit to His will. Enga-
ging in the debate on the wearing of the veil in public schools, Bone, echoing Brooks,
states: “The underlying rationale for the hijab is that women should cover their crowning
glory so as not to provoke feelings of ‘lust’ in men; whereas in this society we have (sup-
posedly) progressed to the view that it is men’s responsibility to control their sexual urges
whatever women are wearing”.48 The implication here is that veiled Muslim women rep-
resent a backward ideology that threatens the progress that Western women have made in
achieving equal rights. Bone’s message mirrors the rationale of the Asian invasion narra-
tive of some 150 years ago: the progressive West is pitted against the regressive and
oppressive East. It is perhaps ironic that the argument of the progressive West has not
progressed since it first appeared in the 1800s.
While the narrative of the Asian invasion that emerged in late nineteenth and early
twentieth century Australia was predominantly a male genre, the vast majority of
recent books that explore the role of women in Islam are largely feminist in inspiration.
In Hales’ novel, The Little Blue Pigeon, published in 1903, the oppressive treatment of
women by the Japanese is a central theme rendered through a love story between a Japa-
nese woman and an Englishman. The female subject discovers the meaning of respect in
the only way deemed possible for her: through a relationship with an English gentle-
man.49 In a similar fashion, the array of paperbacks that explored the subject of female
genital mutilation in the late 1990s emphasise the heroic flights of the subject from
oppression to freedom. Books such as Aman, Desert Flower and Do They Hear You
When You Cry? follow a similar story line: “excision and infibulation, arranged marriage
(usually of a pubescent girl with a much older man), flight to safety and rescue (including
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resettlement in a foreign country, usually the USA)”.50 Rather than highlighting the
devastating health effects of female genital mutilation: infection; problems with child-
birth and fertility, these stories highlight the escape from oppression to the freedom
and justice of the West.
Underlying the “invasion narrative” was an implication that an Australia demasculi-
nised through the pursuit of feminist objectives was an Australia vulnerable to the
threat of invasion from the Asian hoards. Masculinist commentary on the role of
women in Australian society was considerably influenced by comparisons, often heroic
in their generality, between Western and Eastern practices on the treatment of women.
The barbarous practices of the East were invoked to limit female claims to greater equal-
ity, but the “invasion narrative” establishes that women were often reminded of how
much better off they were than their Eastern sisters.
Similarly feminist commentary on the role of Muslim women in Islamic societies is
influenced by comparisons between secular and Islamic ideologies. The practice of
veiling is invoked as proof of the gender oppression of women in Islam. Underlying
much of the Western feminism discourse on Islam is a conviction that Islamic society
is not as progressive as Western society and that the status accorded to women is the
singular, most significant measure of progress. There are some striking continuities
between the masculinised “invasion narrative” of the late nineteenth century and femin-
ist discourse on the veil a century or so later. Where the “invasion narrative” places a
“fully realized masculinity” as “defiantly anti-Asian”,51 the feminist discourse on the
veil places a fully realized feminist objective as anti-veil. Where the “invasion narrative”
sought to maintain a spirit of “defiant masculinity”,52 the discourse on the veil seeks to
maintain a condition of defiant feminism.
The “Veiled Threat”
By the late 1990s, the discourse on the veil in the Australian popular media directly situ-
ated the Muslim woman in two ways. Firstly, the veil is inextricably linked to the cultural
threat posed by Islam. Secondly, since the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers and the
Pentagon in 2001, the “veiled threat” has expanded to include a threat to Australia’s
security.53
The image of the Muslim woman embodies the cultural threat to Australia in particu-
lar and the West more generally from Islam. The political and public debate surrounding
the right of Muslims to wear the various forms of the veil: hijab, chador or burqa often
masks a deeper concern with the Islamification of Australia. Here, the veiled Muslim
woman is a symbol both of anti-assimilationist defiance and of female servitude, charac-
teristics which are central to the “clash of cultures” in which Muslim Australians, marked
as culturally incompatible “other” are thought incapable of “fitting in”. The paradox of
the veil symbolism is that the veil represents both oppression and dissention. In both the
political arena and the media, the point is often made that the act of veiling spells the
rejection of Australian society and the political values of liberal democracies. The under-
lying assumption is that “elements of Islam have an agenda hostile not only to Australia’s
values but also to the basic tenets of Western civilisation”.54 In articles which refer to the
veil debate, “Muslims” are clearly demarcated from “Australians”. Narratives about the
veil are frequently prefaced by comments such as: “The Middle Eastern community has
to understand that if they want to live in this society. . .”.55
In February 2006, the Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, aroused controversy
when he stated that “most Australians” would find the Islamic dress “confronting”.56 His
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comments follow those of Liberal backbenchers in 2005, Sophie Panopolous and
Bronwyn Bishop, who called for a ban on the wearing of headscarves in public
schools. Both Panopolous and Bishop appealed to a deep-seated anxiety about the Isla-
misation of Australia:
I fear a frightening Islamic class emerging, supported by a perverse interpret-
ation of the Koran where disenchantment breeds disengagement, where power-
ful and subversive orthodoxies are inculcated into passionate and
impressionable young Muslims, where the Islamic mosque becomes the breed-
ing ground for violence and rejection of Australian law and ideals, where extre-
mists hijack the Islamic faith with their own prescriptive and unbending version
of the Koran and where extremist views are given currency and validity. . ..Why
should one section of the community be stuck in the Dark Ages of compliance
cloaked under a veil of some distorted form of religious freedom?57
The rhetoric on the wearing of the veil appealed directly to concerns about the clash of
cultures. In reference to her comment on the banning of the veil in public schools, MP
Bronwyn Bishop stated: “what I was saying was not about headscarves per se, it’s about a
clash of cultures where there are extremist Muslim leaders who are calling for the over-
throw of the laws that give me my freedom and my equality as defined by the society in
which I live”.58 In this discourse Muslim women become symbols of an imagined cul-
tural divide between Australian Muslims as “other” and Australia’s Anglo-Celtic cultural
heritage. The threat of Islam, personified in the veiled Muslim woman, is a threat to the
values of liberal democracy where “women and men are equal”.59 In stark contrast to her
liberated Australian counterpart, the veiled Muslim woman stands as a “confronting”
expression of “sexual apartheid” and a “retrograde curtailment of women’s rights”,60
and hence a demonstration of Islam’s incapacity to exist in the “free West”.
Underlying the imagery of the veil is the Orientalist discourse of Muslims as lustful and
motivated by unnatural sexual urges. While images of violence and terrorism persist,
Islam is also frequently linked to sexuality. Karim notes that the portrayal of oriental
sexuality is a “primary preoccupation of many writers, poets, and painters of the Roman-
tic period”.61 Oriental women are often portrayed as sexual slaves who spend their lives
confined in harems in sexual preparedness:
Depictions of Oriental women differed qualitatively from those of European
women because. . .discourses on Eastern sexuality generally occur within the
context of imperial power. The desires and characteristics that one does not
admit having often are projected onto the Other; these features are made out
to be exceptions in one’s own society and the norm in that of the latter.62
The Asian invasion narratives also drew heavily on Orientalist discourses of lust and
sexuality where the treatment of women as sexual possessions is seen to be an inherent
trait of the oriental races. It followed that in an Asianised Australia, Australian women
would inevitably suffer the same humiliating fate.63
In an interview on the riots that occurred on Sydney’s Cronulla beach in December
2005 one of the youths involved in the incident expressed the belief that Muslim law con-
doned the rape of women. He added that Australia was at risk of becoming an Islamic
state:
They will probably, like, possibly out-breed us. And once they get the numbers,
they can vote their members into parliament. And once their members are in
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parliament, they can pass laws, like, they’ve already tried to get the Islamic law
into Australia a few times.64
More recently, the veil has come to be associated with the threat of terrorism. It is here
that the veil takes on a whole new meaning. While images of violence have been central to
the stereotype of Muslims in the Australian media, the preoccupation with the veil as a
symbol of Muslim women’s oppression shifted to a perception of the veil as possible
threat to Australia’s security. Australian Christian Democrat MP Fred Nile in 2002
called for a public ban on the veil, because a woman could easily hide a bomb in her
chador.65 This has since been followed intermittently by a media debate which canvasses
whether, for reasons of public security, various versions of the veil should be banned in
Australia. The debates over the veil are often clearly linked to issues of national security
and social cohesion. Reports on the Cronulla beach riots in 2005 again drew on the
imagery of the veil. Several articles referred to a “veil of secrecy” descending “on the
Arab community” over the riots and those involved.66 The veil represents impenetrable
secrecy and an unnerving suspicion that veiled women have something to hide. Whereas
the veil was once assumed to be hiding uninhibited sexual desires it is now also assumed
by some to be hiding weapons of mass destruction.
Conclusion
There are some signs that a different view of Muslim women in Australia, one which
takes into account that they are heterogenous and can exercise freedom in their choice
of dress is beginning to penetrate the popular media. A recent article in the popular
Australian Women’s Weekly follows the lead of other popular women’s magazines and pre-
sents the stories of six Australian Muslim women in their own words. In introducing the
article, the author recounts her initial feelings of discomfort upon entering a room of
Muslim women who “wore funny clothes and left their shoes at the door”. As she
meets the women, these feelings dissipate:
Inside, everyone was smiling, friendly, welcoming. They didn’t come across as
downtrodden or oppressed and they didn’t look like thugs or terrorists—what-
ever terrorists look like. Then it dawned on me that I was falling into the trap of
making assumptions about a whole group of people I was labelling with the
catch-all of “Muslim”.
Notably, the bulk of the article presents the images and voices of six of the women she met
that day in their various garb: unveiled, hijab, chador and burqa.67 This article, and others
like it, indicate that there may be a change in media representation of Muslim women that
recognises that the historically inherited stereotypes do not represent the reality of many
women’s lives.
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